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KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, Clarence E. Baker, Judge
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IN THE SUPREME c.OURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

R.

~f.

SCOVILLE,
Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 7824

KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,
Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMEN·T OF THE CA'SE
· This .is an action on a contract seeking. to recover
certain bonus payments claimed by the app·ellant for the
year 1949 while the appellant was employed by respondent. The case was tried in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah. Trial was before a Judge
and jury. The trial Judge granted certain of the respondent's motions to strike certain testimony on the ground
that it violates the Parol Evidence Rule (R. 87), and
certain other testimony on the ground that the witness,
Leslie Carl Borsum had no authority to bind the Kellogg Sales Company (R. 87). The trial Judge then diSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rected a verdict and judgment was entered thereon on the
8th day of February, 1952 (R. 93). Notice of appeal was
filed March 5, 1952 (R.· ·94). Designation of record on
·appeal was filed ~arch 5, 1952 (R. 95) ,' and an order
extending the time for filing the record on appeal to the
21st day of Ap·ril, 1952 was entered on the 11th day of
April, 1952 (R. 97).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

~

The appellant, Mr. R. M. Scoville, ·65 years of· age
in April 1952 (R. 13), of Salt Lake City, Utah, was em~ ·
ployed by the respondent, Kellogg Sales Company, as a
salesman and serviceman on August 15, 1944 (R. 13) .
. For convenience and clarity the appellant will hereinafter be referred to as Mr. Scoville and the respondent
will hereinafter be referred to as the Company. At that
time his territory included the State of Nebraska and
Kansas (R. 13). In July of 1946 Mr. Scoville was transferred to Battle Creek, Michigan (R. 13) where he conducted fur feed -business for the. Company.. In March·
of 1947_ Mr. Scoville was transferred to the western
territory for the purpose. of conducting fur feed_ business
for the Company (R. 14). This territory consisted of
that ·area from Denver to the west coast of the United
States (R. 14). At this time Mr. 'Scoville was paid a
salar~, given expenses and furnish~d an automobile (R.
14). In April of 1947, Mrs. Tena Jensen, the Production
Manager of the Company's Omaha plant, requested Mr.
Scoville to.undertake to sell turkey feed produced by the
Companys' plant in Omaha, Nebraska (R.17).
2
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The Con1pany sells turkey feed under a plan kilown
as a turkey finanre progran1 (R. 57). The Company
furnished nir. Scoville and the dealers with contract
forn1s (R. 57). Under the terms of this agreement the
Co1npany agreed to finance the feed for turkeys raised
by the far1ners. Estimates of the consumers need for
feed would-be set out in the contract (R. 59). In the fall
of the year the jobbers handling the feed would have the
contract forms. The dealers would then get the farmers
to sign the contracts (R. 58). After these contracts were
signed by the farmers they were then sent to Mr. Williams, an employee of the Company (R. 24), at Omaha
(R. 58). After the contracts were approved by the Company,.s Omaha office, a copy of the contract was then
sent to Mr. Scoville (R. 58). The- farmers gene!ally .
used more than the estimates contained in the contracts
(R. 59). Of the farmers entering into the contracts, very
few terminated or cancelled the contracts (R. 59). As
the turkey growing season progressed the dealer or Mr.
Scoville would notify. the Omaha plant how much feed to .
ship at a given time (R. 60). At the time this feed was
shipped by the Omaha plarit a copy of the invoice was
sent to Mr. Scoville (R. 60), and from these invoices
the tonnages were figured by Mr. Scoville (R. 60) . The
feed was shipped to. the jobber or sub-dealers and the
jobber or sub-dealer would then deliver to the farmers
(R. 59). All of the contracts were written and signed
by the 1st of July, 1949 (R. 81). The last contract accepted on turkey feed by July 1, 1949 (R. 81).
During the year 1947, Mr. Scoville sold approxi-

3
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mately 100 cars of turkey feed, averaging 30 tons per
car (R. 17). In the last part of January, 1948, Mr. Scoville was advised that he would receive a bonus of $2.00
a ton on all protein feed sold in the· territory (R. 14).
This notification consisted of a bulletin which was introduced and admitted (R. 16) as appellant's Exhibit A,
which is Bulletin 148-3, dated January 29, 1948, and
initialed by W. H. Williams, Jr., Sales Manager, Mixed
Feed Department, Omaha Plant (R. 14). For the year
1948 appellant did not receive any bonus under this arrangement. (R. 18). The reason for not receiving any
bonus being that Mr. Scoville's expenses had used up
practically all of his bonus and he was building for another year during the year 1948 (R. 18}.
During the fall of 1948 the respondent started talking about the 1949 contracts with the far~ers (R. 20).
This discussion of the 1949 contracts was started as soon
as the dressing of the· 1948 turkeys was commenced.
When the 1949 contracts were sold in the fall of the year
1948, they wer~ add~d to the next year's business. Contracts for the sale of turkey feed were written from the
fall of 1948 until June or July of 1949 (R. 20).
After receip~t of Bulletin 148-3,. appellant's Exhibit
A, Mr. Scoville worked longe-r hours, worked Saturdays
and.Sundays (R. 71) and increased the accounts (R. 70)
and the supply of feed that was shipped to the western
territory (R. 71). In 1948 when the business became
quite large, Mrs. Scoville, wife· of the appellant, aCcompanied Mr. 'Scoville at all times and kept all the records
4
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re~peet

to the conduct of the business (R. 76).
On November 4, 1948, ~lr. Leslie Carl Borsum, Sales
Manager for the United States for the Company (R. 21)
and Mrs. Scoville had breakfast together. The conversation 'vhich took place was such that a reasonable inference could be dra\vn that the bonus plan for 1949 would
be the same as that for 1948 (R. 23-24, 77-78).
On April 16, i949, while Mr. Scoville, Mr. L. C.
Borsum and Mr. W. H. Williams, an employee of the
Kellogg Sales Company (R. 24), were attending a sales
meeting (R. 2±) in Omaha, Nebraska, these gentlemen
and nlrs. Scoville met in Mr. Scoville's hotel room. At
that til11e there was some conversation about the number
of contracts for that year, the amount of feed that it
would take to fill the amount of the contracts, and whether
or not the Company could make that amount of feed
(R. 25). This conversation took place before the regular
sales meeting (R. 25). At this time there was a conversation from which the only reasonable inference that can
be drawn is that the 1949 bonus would be computed at
the same rat-e as the 1948 bonus was computed, i.e~, a
$2.00 per ton bonus.
During late July or early August, 1949, at a sales
meeting in Omaha, Nebraska, Mr. Scoville had a conversation with Mr. Borsum from which the only infer..
ence that may be drawn is that the bonus of_ $2.00 per
ton of feed would be paid on the sales made by Mr. Scoville for the year 1949 "(R. 27).
On July 24, 1949, Mr. Scoville wrote a letter to Mr.
Borsum (which was admitted as the Company's Exhibit

\vith
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10), from which an inference may be drawn that Mr.
Borsum had written to Mr. Scoville with respect to a
bonus. plan for 1949, in which letter Mr. Scoville said he
could not give his immediate reaction to the proposal
of. Mr. Borsum in that it might be taken that Mr. Scoville would receive no bonus for 1949.
On August 2, 1949, Mr. Borsum wrote to Mr. Scoville stating that with reference to a bonus plan for .
1949, Mr. 'Scoville was practically assured of a bonus,
and invited Mr. Scoville to attend a sales meeting in
Omaha, Nebraska on August 8th and 9th, 1949, (this
letter was admitted in evidence as the Company's exhibit number 11 (R. 65) ) .
·During the last part o.f July or early part of August,
Mr. Scoville received a writing which is captioned "Bonus
Plan for 1949" (and which was admitted as Mr. Scoville's
Exhibit B) (R. 20) setting out certain figures to be
paid as a bonus on sales for the year 1949. This was
the ·first written notice received by Mr. Scoville which
indicated that the figures to be used by the Company in
computing the 1949 bonus would be different than that
used to compute the 1948 bonus (R. 19). Mr. Scoville
protested several times orally to Mr. Williams and Mr.
Borsum about the writing which he received as setting
out figures to be used by the Comp·any in computing the
1949 bonus (R. 72, R. 28). Mr. Scoville did. not make
too active a protest about the 1949 writing because he was
afraid of losing his job. He felt that he was too old a man
to lose the job and have to go out and hunt for a new
one (R. 71).
6
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On January 9, 1950, ~Ir. Williams, Mr. B·orsum and
Mr. Seaville attended the Turkey Sho'v in Minneapolis,
~Iinnesota (R. 28). After Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum
had retired, they had a conyersation during which it was
said by nir. Borsum that Thlr. Scovil~e would have to
follo'v the ne'\v schedule of the bonus which was issued
in . A.ugust, that if Thlr. Scoville took it up with the higherups, Mr. Borsum, Thlr. Williams and Mr. Scoville would
all lose their jobs, that if Mr. Scoville would keep his
mouth shut, Thlr. Scoville could stay on indefinitely as
long as he was doing the job (R. 29). (Also, R. 71,
which is not quite as strong.)
On January 10, 1950, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr.
Scoville, stating that there would_ be no bonus plan for
1950, but that Mr. Scoville's wages were raised for the
year 1950. (Company's Exhibit 3, admitted in evidence R. 45).
On .January 30, 1950, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr.
Scoville enclosing a check drawn in the sum of $3,544.35,
in which it was stated that the amount of the bonus was
based on ~Ir. William's figures, and that such was subject to .change. (Admitted in evidence as Company's
Exhibit 6 at R .. 49). On February 10, 1950, Mr. Williams
wrote to Mr. Scoville acknowledging receipt of the check
in the sum of $3,544.35, and stated that the Battle Creek
office had been instructed to forward a check less Mr.
Scoville's withholding tax. Mr. Williams also stated
that a corrected check would be sent as soon as Mrs.
Helen L. Scoville's (R. 49) figures had been audited
(admitted as the Company's Exhibit 7, R. 50).
7·
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On February 3, 1950, while in. Billings, ~1ontana,
Mr. Scoville became ill (R. 56); he was ·suffering from
high blood pressure (R. 68). He left Billings, Montana
and went to Phoenix, Arizona, as prescribed by a doctor
(R. 68). He remained in Phoenix, Arizona until Aprill,
1950, (R. 68) at which time he returned. to Utah and his
employment .CR. 56).
On ·F.ebruary 6, 1950, a check in the sum of $2,981.92,
was drawn by the Company .(admitted as the Company's
Exhibit 4, at R. 54). This check was endorsed by Mr.
Scoville (R. 48).
On April24, 1950,.a -cheek was drawn by the Kellogg
Sales Company in the sum of $1,026.98, upon a Battle
Creek, Michigan Bank (admitted as the Company's Exhibit 4, R. 54) which was transmitted by a letter written
by Mr. Borsum (R. 51) dated Apri125, 1950, which mentioned the check (letter admitted as the Company's Exhibit 8, R. 51). This ·check was endorsed by Mr. Scoville
(R. 48).
On January 1, 1951, Mr. Scoville was retired from
the Company (R. 68). Prior to his retirement Mr. Borsum offered Mr. Scoville a position in Ohio, under the
.terms of which Mr. ScoiVille was required to sell so many
tons of feed every month to stay in the position, if ·he did
not make the sales,. he was out of the job (R. 69). On
December 30, 1950, Mr. S.coville wrote .to Mr. Lyle C.
.Roll, an employee of the Company, protesting the handling of the bonus for 1949, (letter admitted as the Company.'s Exhibit 12, R. 67). On January 27, 1951, Mr. Scoville wrote to Mr. Roll, protesting the handling·· of. the
8
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1949 bonus, and denying that the signing of the checks
paid by the Con1pany 'vas an acceptance of settlement
of his rlain1. (Letter admitted as the Company's Exhibit
13, R. GS).
At the close of illr. Scoville's case, the Company,
through colinsel, renewed its motion to strike the conversations objected to during the trial on the ground that.
they attempted to yary the terms of the 1948-1949 con- ·
tracts by parol evidence and the Company's motion to
strike statements made by l\1:r. Borsum on the grou~d
that his conversations would not bind the C-ompany in
that he was not.an employee of the Company, but the employee of a different Company (R. 84-85). The Company
then moved for a dismissal on a directed verdict (R. 85).
The court granted the Company's motions to -strike the
testimony and directed a verdict (R. 87) upon which
judgment was entered thereon (R. 93).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PAROL EVIDENCE OF AN ORAL AGREEMENT WHICH
IS SEPARATE AND APART FROM A PRIOR· WRITTEN
AGREEMENT OR A_ MODIFICATION OF A PRIOR WRITTEN AGREEMENT MAY BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING SUCH
PAROL EVIDENCE AS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.

POINT II
PAROL EVIDENCE TO PROVE A PRIOR ORAL AGREEMENT DIFFERENT IN ITS TERMS 'FROM A PURPORTED

9
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WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY ADDUCED
TO PROVE THE VERBAL AGREEMENT DIFFERENT IN
ITS TERMS FROM THE PURPORTED WRITTEN AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS NEVER ASSENTED TO.

POINT III
THE TESTIMONY OF MR .. SCOVILLE WAS TO THE
EFFECT THAT L. C. BORSUM WAS THE SALES MANAGER
. FOR THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES OF THE KELLOGG
SALES COMPANY. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE
SAID MR. SCOVILLE AND THE SAID L. C. BORSUM
TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIP OF A
SALESMAN AND HIS SUPERIOR IN THE SAME ORGANIZATION, AND THE DOCUMENTARY .EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS CONSISTENT WITH AND TENDED
TO ESTABLISH.THE SAME FACTS AS TESTIFIED TO BY
MR. SCOVILLE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
SUCH TESTIMONY ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH WAS
NOT BINDING UPON THE KELLOGG SALES COMPANY.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT. ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT FOR THE COMPANY AFTER WRONGLY EXCLUDING
TESTIMONY WHICH TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE CASE
FOR MR. SCOVILLE.

POINT I
PAROL EVIDENCE OF AN ORAL.AGREEMENT WHICH
IS SEPARATE AND APART FROM A PRIOR WRITTEN
AGREEMENT OR A MODIFICATION OF A PRIOR WRITTEN AGREEMENT MAY BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING SUCH
PAROL EVIDENCE AS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.

10
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On January 29, 1948, the Company put in writing
a bonus plan for the year 1948, called Bulletin 148-3. ·
This bonus plan was to end, be changed or continue at
the end of 1948 as per the terms of the writing. On Novenlber -±, 1948, Mr. Scov.ille entered into a conversatiun
with l\lr. Borsum from which a reasonable inference
n1ight be drawn that the same rate would be used in
determining a 1949 bonus. On April 16, 1949, Mr. Scoville, l\Ir. Borsum, nir. Williams and Mrs .. Scoville had
a-conversation from which it might be fou?d that the rate
·used in determining the 1949 bonus would be the same
as that used in 1948, and which was accepted. The trial
court granted the Company's motion to strike the testi-:mony as to such conversations on the grounds that they
altered or varied the writt~n bonus plan for 1948. These
conversations either created a new agreement with respect to the 1949 bonus, modified the 1948 writing ~o include 1949, or were in complete conformity with the 1948
Bulletin.
In January of 1948, Kellogg Sales Company sent out
a Bulletin numbered 148-3. which was introduce:d at the
trial as Exhibit A for Mr. Scoville (admitted R. 16)
which stated as follows:
"Bulletin 148-3
Omaha, Nebraska
January 29', 1948
Field Servicemen :
As we discussed in our meeting at Battle
Creek, the bonus plan for 1948 will be as follows.
We will credit you~ accoun.t on the basis of $2.00
per ton allowance on all feed including Sweet Mix
11
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Pellets but not including Hominy· Feed, and
charge' against your account what is paid to you
in the way of salary, expenses, operation of the
car and your living expenses, but not including
automobile depreciation. At the close of 1948
·whatever amount is over will be paid at the end
of the year.
Of course this means that we will look at
situation at the end of 1948 and see if this .is
best possible bonus arrangemen.t, both from
standpoint of the individual salesman and
·Kellogg Company.
W. H .. Williams, Jr.
Sales Manager
Mixed Feed Dept.
Omaha Plant
WHW:mc
(s) W. H. W. Jr."

the
the
the
the

On N oyember 4, 1948, Mr. Leslie Carl Bors~m, Sales
Manager for the United ·States for the Company (R. 21),
Mr. Scoville and Mrs. Helen 'Scoville, had breakfast
together at Portland, Oregon, while attending the Oregon.
·Fur Show. Mr. Scoville testified as .follows:
R. 22:
Q. ·Will you state, Mr. ~coville, the best you can
recall what was said by yourself, or Mr.
Borsum, or by your wife~
MR. AADNESEN: Just a minute, a que~stion
on voir dire.
VOIR DIRE EX·AMINATION
BY. MR. AADNESEN:
Q. Is this conversatio~n purporting to relate to
any bonus plans~
·
A.

I think it does.
12
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::\lR,. _._\~\DNESEN: Your Honor, I object to
it on the basis it would be parole evidence to
atte1npt to vary any written contracts whieh
are not before this court and upon the further
ground it would be inadn1issible under the
circun1stances just discussed with you on
the n1atter it is an attempt to bind Kellogg
Sales Company by a statement of Kellogg
Company.
~lR.

CALLISTER: If the court please, it is
no attempt to vary a written contract, it is an
attempt to vary one not received until July
Qr August, 1949. This conversation took place
the latter part of 1948.
THE COl'"RT: The objection is overruled.

Q.

(BY niR.. CALLISTER) Do you recall my
last question, Mr. Scoville~

A.

What was said at the breakfast table, is that
correct~

Q.

That is correct.

A.

Well, I had sent Mr. Borsum a letter on what
I figured I would do in the year 1949 and he
asked me if I honestly thought I would sell
500 cars of feed and I told him the figures
absolutely showed that way.
And he said, "That is a lot of feed."
I said: "I know it, and it is going to mean a
lot of hard work," and I said: "With the
bonus figured the way they are now, I am
also going to make a lot of money, around
$30,000.00."
He said he didn't see any reason why the
bonus should be changed at that time, there

13
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was nothing that should be changed in the
setup for 1949. He also stated the thing he
would want me to do, when I got my bonus,
was to buy a home and settle down in it. I
had been traveling too much.
He said: "I think if you would spend about
$4,000.00 for a home it would be adequate
for you and Helen to live in." (R. 24).
Mrs. Helen L. Scoville testified with respect to certain conversations as follows:
R. 76, 77, 78:
Q. Mrs. Scoville, you have heard your husband
testify to a conversation that took place lat.e
in November or early in December, 1948 at
the Multnomah Hotel in Portland, Oregon~
A. Yes.

Q.

Between Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum and
yourself~

A.

That is right.

Q.

Will you relate what was said at that conversation between the parties present~

A.

Well, I think I can relate MR. AADNESEN: Of course my objection
will be renewed to this, may I request the
record show any conversations that may be
brought out, my objection goes to them and
subject to my motion to strike made hereto. .
fore, and kept under advisement until arguments~

THE COURT: Yes.

Q.

(BY MR. CALLISTER) Will you relate the
conversation~
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.L\.

...\s nearly as I ran rerall, of course, "\Ve had all
been interested in the two-dollar-per-ton
bonus berause it meant quite a lot to us.
This n1orning, under discussion at the breakfast table, at the Multnomah, between Mr.
Borsum, ~Ir. Scoville and myself, they were
talking about tonnage.
~lr.

Scoville told Mr. Borsum the approximate tonnage for 1949, and it was at this fox
and mink show, and, of course, our discussion
on the tonnage was in regard to turkey business in this section of the country, and Mr.
Scoville told ~Ir. Borsum it would be close
to 500 cars of feed. And Mr. Borsum said:
''Well, that was an awful lot of feed, and if
it was possible to sell that much out here,
Mr. Scoville would certainly be justified in
having some help."
~Ir.

Scoville said yes he would try to manage
it alone until late summer or early fall, then
he would like to have help, and he called attention to the fact MR. AADNESEN: I object to it, I think
counsel should ask questions and have them
answer. We are getting an extraneous matter
in here.

Q.

(BY MR. CALLISTER)
what.

A.

Mr. Scoville said: "Mr. Borsum, this will run
into quite a lot. of bonus for us, this $2.00 per
ton."

State who said

MR. AADNE'SEN: I would like a.t this time
to have questions and answeTs so we can
make objections if we desire.
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Q.

(BY MR. CALLISTER) What did Mr. Borsum say to that~

A.

They were interested in the feed business,
the volume of the feed business, he realized
we would get quite a bonus out of it, and the
tonnage had been up to that time 500 cars,
which would net us about $30,000.00.
He emphatically stated he would like very
much for us to find a home somewhere and
buy it, he thought a $4,000.00 home would be
adequate for us. (R. 78).

On April 16, 1949, while Mr. Scoville, Mr. Leslie
Carl Borsum and Mr. W. H. Williams, an employee of the
Kellogg S·ales Company, (R. 24) w.ere attending a sales
meeting (R. 24) in Omaha, Nebraska, these gentlemen
and Mrs. Scoville met in Mr. Scoville's hotel room. At
this time a conversation took place about which Mr. Scoville testified as follows:
R. 25-26:
Q. And will you state when and where that conversation took place, and who was present~
A.

Well, before the meeting took place Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams both were in our room
upstairs, and my wife and myself was there.
And we talked about the number of contracts
in and the amount of feed it would take to fill
the amount of contracts that was in, and
whether they could make the feed or not at
that time.

Q.

Mr. Scoville, will you say, as best you can,
what you said and what any other individual
said?

A.

Well, I asked -
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1\lR~. ~\ . .\.l)NESEN:

Your Honor, on the srune
baBis as before, one question on voir dire.

Q.

(\'" oir Dire by ~Ir. Aadnesen) Did this conversation pertain to anything about 1948 and
'49 bonus'?

.A...

It 'Yill.
~IR ..A. ..:\. DNESEN:

I renew my objection on
the basis it is an attempt to vary written
evidence before the Court on parole evidence,
and on the ground it is an attempt to bind the
employees of one organization against another.
THE COl"TRT: Well, the objection is overruled.

Q.

(BY :JIR. CALLISTER) Well, go ahead, Mr.
Scoville, and relate that conversation and
designate who said what~

A.

I asked both ~1r. Borsum and Mr. Williams
if they thought I had about enough turkey
contracts in this territory.

And Mr. Williams stated I should go ahead
and sell all the contracts I could. He could
make the feed. He was in charge of the
Omaha Plant.
I ·said: "You are also going to pay me a lot
of bonus too."
He said: "We have got money to pay the
bonus, you sell the feed .."
Then we left the room and started downstairs.
Q. Who left the room~
A. Mr. Borsum, Mr. Williams and myself left
the room to go downstairs.
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I said: "Bill, it will take a lot of feed, and I
will get a lot of bonus, it is pretty near time
to shut off out there."
He said : "We will take care of you, Kellogg
has got plenty of money and we will make the
feed." (R. 26).
Mrs. Hele,n L. Scoville testified with respect to such conversation as follows:
R. 79:
Q. You heard your husband testify to a conversation which took place in your hotel room
at the Fontenell Hotel in Omaha, Nebraska?
A. Yes.

Q. April16, 1949?
A.

Yes.

Q. Were you present?
A. I was.

Q. Who else was present?
A.

Mr. Borswn, Mr. Williams and Mr. Scoville.

Q. Was anything else said at that time regarding
bonus, or amount of feed to be sold in this
territory? Answe·r "yes" or "no."
A. Yes.
Q. Who said it?
A.

Mr. 'Scoville asked MR. AADNESEN: The record still shows
my objection'
THE COURT: Yes.

A.

Mr. Scoville said that the amount of contracts
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he had \Yritten would be between four hundred thousand and four hundred fifty thousand turkeys, and he suggested they not take
any more contracts and Mr. Williams said
they \Yere ''feed hungry," and they wonld
continue to take contracts as long as they
were justified. Mr. Scoville reminded hiin
again that $2.00 bonus was still in effect, and
there was never anything contrary said to
that. (R. 79).
In Parker vs. Webber County Irrigation Distri_ct,
1925, 65 Utah 354 236 Pac. 1105, an employee· brought an
action on a written contract of employment to recover
for the employee's services .. The employer offered to
prove that the terms of the contract respecting the date
it should become effective were modified by mutual
agreement between the employee and the employer. The
trial court rejected the p·roferred evidence upon the
ground that the modification is made on the same day
that the contract is dated and ruled that if the evidence
were admitted, it would, in effect, vary the terms of the
written instrument by parol evidence. Up.on appeal it was
held by this Honorable Court that a written instrument
may be modified at anytime after the execution of that
written instrument. The court stating that the time intervening between the execution of the instrument and its
modification is not controlling. It is the intention of the
parties to modify the agreement in some particular that
controls.
In Hogan vs. Swayze, 1925, 65 Utah 380, 237 Pac.
1097 at page 389, the court said:
It may be said in passing, howeve-r, that the
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rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary
the terms of a plain, unambiguous instrument, in
writing, is elementary in this and every other
jurisdiction of the country. Consequently it is not
necessary to cite the authorities relied on by appellants. Such authorities apply only to prior or
contemporaneous agreements, and not to agreements subsequently made. Prior or contemporaneous agreements are held to be merged in the
written contract, and therefore not admissible
in evidence.
In 32 C.J.S., Section 1004, at page 1008, the rule
is stated as follows :
The rule forbidding the admission of parol or
extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict
a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement
between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument
was executed, notwithstanding such agreement
may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract
of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for
the parol evidence does not in any way deny
that the orginal agreement of the parties was that
which the writing purports to express, but merely
goes to show that the parties have exercised their
right to change or abrogate the same, or to make
a new and independent contract. It must appear,
however, that there was a subsequent agreement,
mere negotiations or representations being insufficient; and it is usually necessary· that such
subsequent agreement be founded on a consideration, although a contrary view has been asse·rted.
Where the statutes p-rohibit, as they do in some
jurisdictions, the alteration of a written contract
20
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by a subsequent unexecuted parol agree1nent, such
an agreen1ent cannot of course be shown. flowever, proof of alteration by. an executed oral
agreement is usually per1nitted under such statutes: and such a statute has been held inapplicable
to an entirely ne\Y agreement Yalid in itself. While
parol evidence of a subsequent agreement between
the parties on a point not covered by the original
contract is admissible, such evidence is inadmissible for the purpose of explaining or interpreting
an unainbiguou~ 'Yritten contract.
By inference fro1n the last paragraph in Bulletin
148-3, Exhibit A for Mr. Scoville, the rate used in computing the bonus for 1948 would either cease and determine as of the end of the year 1948; continue for the
year 1949 at the same rate, or a new rate would be determined and used in computing a 1949 bonus. The only
inference which may be drawn from the conversations
which were objected to by the Company are that there
would be a bonus for the year 1949 and that such bonus
would be computed at the rate of $2.00 per ton of feed
sold as which is the same rate provided in the agreement
of 1948.
If the view is taken that the 1948 bonus plan ceased
and determined at the end of the year 1948, then such
conversations would establish a new oral agreement p.roviding for a bonus at the rate of $2.00 per ton for the
year 1949. This in effect would be entering into a new
bonus contract and admission of the testimony would be
permissible under the Parol Evidence Rule.
If the view is taken that the conversations extended
the 1948 agreement to include the year 1949, then such
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parol e.vidence would be an oral modification of a prior
written agreement. Parol evidence of an oral modification of a prior written agreement is admissible under the
Parol Evidence! Rule.
If the view is taken that such conversations indicated
that the Company had taken a look at the situation at the
end of 1948 and determined that the $2.00 bonus "is the
best possible bonus arrangement, both from the standpoint of the individual salesmen and the Kellogg Company," then such conversations are completely in accord
with the writing referred to as Bulletin 148-3, and such
testimony is not subject to objection upon the ground
that it violates the Parol Evidence Rule in that such is
entirely consistent with the writing and does not alter,
vary or contradict the writing, and consequently is
admissible.
The conversations objected to and stricken did not
alter, did not vary, and did not contradict the written
instrument. Such conversations either formed a subsequent new agre·ement, modified_ the old agreement, or
were in complete conformity with the written instrument.

POINT II
PAROL EVIDENCE TO PROVE A PRIOR ORAL AGREEMENT DIFFERENT IN ITS TERMS FROM A PURPORTED
WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY ADDUCED
TO PROVE THE VERBAL AGREEMENT DIFFERENT IN
ITS TERMS FROM THE PURPORTED WRITTEN AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS NEVER ASSENTED TO.

Mr. 'Scoville offered certain parol evidence of an
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oral agreement for the payu1ent of a bonus in the year
1949. The conYersations out of \vhich. such oral agreeInent arose took place in 1948 and April of 19-!!J. There
is also a presumption in la\v that an i1nplied agreement
as to the payment of a bonus at the rate clai1ned by l\1r.
Scoville arose. ..A. W'Titing was introduced in evidence
\Yhich \vas subsequent to the conversations and the implied agreement, \Yhich writing the Company contended
\\~as a written agreen1ent which could not be modified
by parol evidence.
There was no evidence from which it could be found
as a matter of law that Mr. Scoville gave his assent to
the written instrument as being the agreement of the parties. l\lr. Scoville contested the written instrument as
not being the agreement of the parties. The trial court
granted the Company's motion to strike the parol evidence of the oral agreement on the ground that it was
an attempt to alter or vary the terms of the 1949 writing.
The trial court erred in granting such motion as
the writing was not admitted to be the agreement of the
parties and parol evidence is admissible to show that a
different agreem·ent existed and the writing was not assented to as being the agreement of the parties.
The Bulletin numbered 148-3, dated January 29,
1948, set out under Point I, supra, which established
a 1948 bonus plan, was such that it might be inferred
that the rate used in computing the bonus for 1948 would
either cease and det·ermine as of the end of the year 1948,
continue for the year 1949 at the same rate, or that the
Company would determine a new rate to be used in computing a 1949 bonus.
23
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The conversation that took place on November 4·.,
1948 between Mr. Scoville, Mr. Borsum and Mrs. Helen
L. Scoville, was such that a reasonable inference that
might be drawn therefrom is that a bonus plan would be
established providing the same bonus for the year 1949
as was used to compute the bonus for 1948. The testimony as to this conversation is set out under Point I,
supra.
The conversation which took place on April16, 1949,
the testimony as to which is set out under Point I, is
such that a reasonable inference that might be drawn was
that a definite offer of $2.00 a ton bonus for the year 1949
to be computed at $2.00 a ton which was the same rate as
the 1948 bonus was computed at, was made by Mr. W.
H. Williams at that time, and the conversation and the
conduct of the parties was such that there was an acceptance of such offer out of which a contract or ·an agreement of emplo;yment with a bonus at the rate of $2.00
a ton arose.
During the last part of July or early August of
1949, Mr. Scoville received a writing which is captioned
"Bonus Plan For 1949" and which was admitted as Mr.
Scoville's Exhibit 3 at R~. 20, se:tting out certain figures
to be paid as a bonus on sales for the year 1949. This
was the first written notice received by Mr. Scoville
which indicated that the figures to be used by the· Company in computing the 1949 bonus would be different
than that used to eompute the 1948 bonus (R. 19).
Mr. Scoville protested seve~ral times, orally, to Mr.
Williams (R. 28) concerning this writing and to Mr.
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Borsun1 (R. 72). On January 9, 1950, Mr. Williams, Mr.
Borslm1 and ~lr. Scoville attended the turkey show in
~Iinneapolis, l\linnesota (R. 28). At this time Mr. Borsum told Mr. Scoville that if he, Mr. Scoville, took it up
with the higher-ups, ~fr. Borstun, Mr. Williams and Mr.
Scoville ""'ould all lose their jobs. That if Mr. Scoville
would keep his n1outh shut, Mr. 'Scoville could stay on
indefinitely as long as he was doing the job (R. 29).
l\lr. Scoville felt that he was too old a man to lose the job
and have to go out and hunt for a new one (R. 71).
On February 3, 1950, Mr. Scoville became ill (R.
56). He left Billings, Montana, and went to Phoenix,
Arizona, as prescribed by a doctor (R. 68). He remained
in Phoenix, Arizon~ until April1, 1950 (R. 68) at which
time he returned to Utah and his employment (R. 56).
On December 30, 1950, Mr. Scoville wrote to Mr.
Lyle C. Roll, protesting the handling of the bonus for
194-9. Letter admitted as Company's Exhibit 12 at R.
67.
On January 27, 1951, Mr. Scoville again wrote to l\Ir.
Roll, protesting the handling of the 1949 bonus ~d denying that the signing of checks p·aid by the Comp·any was
an acceptance of the settlement of his claim (letter admitted as the Company's Exhibit 13 at R. 68). In spite
of the above protest and the evidence of an oral agreement for the year 1949, the honorable trial judge granted
the Company's motion to strike the testimony as to the
conversations which took place in 1948 and 1949.
In Goldsteim vs. Robert Dollar Company, S·up.reme
Court of Oregon 1928, 270 Pac. 903, 127 Ore. 29, the ship25
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per of an automobile made arrangements with the carrier
for the shipment of his automobile. These arrangements
were made orally. Subsequent to these oral arrangements
for the shipment of the automobile the carrier issued a
bill of lading which was received by the shipper without
objection. The shipper's automobile was damaged while
in the possession of the carrier. The shipper brought
th~s action on an oral contract, attempting to establish
the liability of the carrier on a basis of the oral contract.
The case went to the jury which returned a verdict for
the shipper. The trial court granted a new trial on the
ground that the trial court should have instructed the
jury that the bill of lading as issued by the carrier was
the contract. The shipper appealed and on. appeal it
was held that the question of assent to the bill of lading
by the shipper was a question of fact for the jury. The
shipper was entitled to submit to the jury his theory
of the case on the ground that the assent to the bill of
lading is a question of fact and the oral contract which
might have arisen prior to the bill of lading was also a
question of fact. The court observed that had the oral
contract been made contemporaneously with the written
bill of lading the parol evidence would be inadmissible.
In Bruce vs. Snow, 18 N. H. 514, it was held that
parol evidence is admissible only when the writing has
been approved to be the agreement of the parties, and
in Haag vs. Owen, 57 N. Y. 644, it was held that where
the writing is in dispute, oral evidence is admissible to
show an oral agreement different than the writing.
The editors of Corpus Juris Secundwn have stated
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the rule as follo,Ys in 3~ C.J.S., Section 967 at Page 932:
The rule 'vhich exeludes parol evidence to
contradict or vary the terms of a 'vritten agreeInent ean be applied only when a 'vritten agre-enlent is proved to exist between the parties, and
consequently parol evidence is admissible to sho'v
that a 'vriting, although purporting on its face to
be a contract, 'Yas not in fact intended by the parties to be such. Furthermore, 'vhere a paper set
up as an agreement is not admitted to be such
by the party sought to be affected by it and there
is a conflict of evidence on the question whether
it is such agreen1ent or not, the court will not exclude testin1ony adduced to prove a verbal agreeInent differing in its terms from the written one,
but 'vill merely direct the jury to disregard such
testimon~- in case they find the 'vriting to be the
agreement of the parties.

Mr. Scoville is also aided by an implied contract
that the bonus for 1949 would be computed at the same
rate as the bonus for 1948 was computed.
In Holton vs. Hart Mill Co., Sup. Ct. of Wash. 1946,
166 Pac. 2d 186, an employee- brought an action to recover damages for a breach of contract for personal services. From a judgment in the employee's favor, the ein.ployer appealed. The contract was based upon a letter
written by the employer to the effect that he would undertake to keep the payroll records of the emplo~er for a
period of one year at a flat fee of $2,100.00. The employer answered by way of a letter stating that the employment for period of one year at a flat fee of $2,100.00 would be agreeable. The employee performed the
services for the period of one year and continued with

a
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the work after·the expiration of the initial year. After
expiration of the initial year provided for by the letters,
the employer told the employee to "stay and continue as
theretofore" after which the employee continued with the
work. The trial court found that the contract established
by the letters was renewed. The employer appealed and
the ·supreme Court of Washington held that the finding
of the trial court was warranted in fact and in law. The
Supreme Court stating at page 187, "furthermore where
a contract of employment for a definite term expir.es and
the employee continues to render the same services, the
presumption is that he is serving under a new contract
having the same terms and conditions."
In 56 C.J.S., Section 10 at J?age 82, the editors have
stated the rule as follows :
As a general rUle, sometimes by virtue of
statutory provisions, where one enters into the
service of another for a definite period, and continues in the employment after the expiration of
that period, without any new contract, the presumption is that the employment is continued on
the terms of the original con tract, and provisions
and restrictions forming essential parts of the
contract, although collateral to the employment
itself, continue in force. A change in one of the
terms does not destroy the presumption as to the
other terms. Thus, a mere. change in the contract
with respect to the amount of salary will not affect
the applicability of the rule.
While it has been held that, where the original
term is for more than a year, a continuance in employment will not support a presumption of a
renewal for the full period of the original term,
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but only of en1ployu1ent fro1n year to year thereafter, \Yhere the hiring is for a definite ter111 less
than a year, it has been held that a renewal for
that tern1 "'"ill be in1plied, but there is authority
to the rontrary. lTnless the original contract 'vas
for an entire year and the service rendered under
it rontinued for at least a year, no presumption of
rene""'al for another year on the same terms arises
by reason of continuance in. the same service.
It has been ~eld, however, that the presumption """ill not arise where the original contract is .
absolutely void, or where the services rendered
after the expiration of the tern1 are of a different
character from that called for by the contract,
and it may be rebutted by showing a new agre·ement or that a different hiring was in fact intended by the parties. A new contract may arise, although it is shown under an agreement which is
in tern1s an express renewal of the original contract. Also, when, at the close of a definite term,
negotiations are pending for a new contract, it
has been held that the law will not conclude them
by a presumption of an implied contract, and
when such negotiations have been in fact concluded by the parties, and a new arrangeme,nt
agreed on, it is immaterial that, although contemplated, the new agre·ement has. not been reduced to writing.
Rights and obligations under former contract.
Where separate. and independent contracts
of employment for successive p·eriods of time contain no statement of a settlement of prior dealing
with the parties, there is no presumption that
their mutual claims up. to the date of making a
contract had been adjusted.
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In Otten vs. San Francisco Hotel Owners Association, et al, District Court of Appeals of California, 1946,
168 Pac. 2d 739, the court observes the codification of a
common law rule in the State of California. In this case
recovery is not allowed as the plaintiff in the action was
found to he ari independent contractor and not a servant.

The conversations of Mr. Scoville and representatives of the Company as set out supra under Point I, is
consistent with and gives weight to an agreement providing for the 1949 bonus. A contract for a bonus for the
year 1949 having been entered into by Mr. S.coville
and the Company, the Company attempts to make a writing; delivers it to Mr. Scoville; contends that the writing
is the agreement and then proceeds to exclude any· evidence of any other agreement which arose p-revious thereto on the ground that the writing is the agreement. In
order that this agreement be taken as the agreement between the parties, the Company has the burden of proving that it was an acceptance. The only infe-rence that
can be drawn from the earlier conversation is that there
was no acceptance of the: 1949 writing.
There is substantial evidence that there was a contract prior to the 1949 writing and there is substantial
evidence in the record that the 1949 writing was never
accepted. Mere continuation in the employment of the
Company does. not constitute an acceptance: and mere de·lay in this case does noit constitute an acceptance. There
is considerable evidence in the record explaining the
reason for the delays and protests. There is also evidence
. in the record that states oral protests were made to rep30
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resentatives of the C~on1pany. The only evidence of delay
and protest to representatives in the Company is that the
delay 'Yas with respect to those representatives of the
Co1npany higher in the hierarchy of the Company, which
delay is explained by 1\Ir. Scoville's fea.r of losing his
job.
The court erred in striking this evidence as being
in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. ParoJ evidence .
of a prior existing, oral agreement is admissible when a
writing purported to be the agreement is contested by .
the person showing the prior oral agreement. The case
should have gone to the jury. The jury should have been
instructed that in event the jury found that there had
been an assent to the writing, then the jury was to disregard the parol evidence as to the oral agreement. On
the other hand, if the jury chose to believe that there
was a prior -existing oral agreement and there was no
assent to the writing and the writing did not become a
binding agreement between the parties, then the jury was
to disregard the writing.
~

POINT III
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SCOVILLE WAS TO . THE
EFFECT THAT L. C. BORSUM WAS THE SALES MANAGER
FOR THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES OF THE KELLOGG·
SALES· COMPANY. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE
SAID MR. SCOVILLE AND THE SAID L. C.. BORSUM
TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIP OF' A
SALESMAN AND HIS SUPERIOR IN THE SAME ORGANIZATION, AND THE DOCUMENTA~Y EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS CONSISTENT WITH AND TENDED
TO ESTABLISH THE SAME FACTS AS TESTIFIED TO BY
MR. SCOVILLE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
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SUCH TESTIMONY ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH WAS
NOT BINDING UPON THE KELLOGG SALES COMPANY.

The testimony of Mr. Scoville established that Mr.
Leslie Carl Borsum was the Sales Manager for the
United States for.the Kellogg Sales Company and that
he had authority to bind the Kellogg ·sales Company dur~
ing the dates in question~ Certain of the exhibits admitted in evidence tend to esta'blish that Mr. Borsum
was an employee of the Kellogg Sales Company and had
authority to bind the Kellogg Sales Company. The only
evidence of other employment is the testimony of ~r.
Borsum that ·a.t the time of trial he was employed by the
Kellogg Company. This is not conflicting with the testimony of Mr. Scoville. There was no evidence that during
the dates in question in this action, Mr. Borsum was·
not employed by the Kellogg Sales Comp·any or that he
did not have authority to bind the Kellogg Sales Company at the times of the conversations in question.
The trial court erred in striking the testimony as to
the conversations had by Mr. Scoville with Mr. Borsum.
Mr. Scoville testified that Mr. Leslie Carl Borsum
·is the Sales Manager for the United States for the Kel~
logg Sales Company (R. 21). On voir dire examination
Mr. Scoville testified that Mr. Borsum was the Sales
M·anager of the Kellogg Sales Company and that he knew
such of his own knowledge~ On cross examination, Mr.
Scoville testified that he knew there were two companies,
that is, the Kellogg Company and the Kellogg ~sales
Company ·(R. 30).
On examination of Mr. Borsum, the testimony was as
follows:
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R. 83, S-l:

DIRECT EX_A_MINATION.
Bl~ ~iR.

Q.
. A_.

Q.
~\.

Q.
_._\.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.

CALLISTER:
~Ir. Borsum, "Till you state your name,
please)?

Leslie Carl Borsum.
''-r-here do you reside:~
Battle . Creek, !\Iichigan.
By whom are you employed~
By the l{ellogg Company.
Now, l\Ir. Borsum, how much was paid to Mr.
Scoville, if you recall offhand for the year
1949 in the way of bonus~
I can't recall offhand the exact amount without looking at the checks he was paid in accordance with the 1949 bonus plan.
That is what I want to know. In other words,
.he was paid according to the terms of Exhibit
B," was he not~
Yes sir.
His tonnage was computed and then applied
to this schedule set out in Exhibit B, and he
was paid accordingly, is that not correct~
Yes sir.
So that you figured all that Mr. Scoville had
coming to him was what you p·aid him under ·
this~
·
·

Yes sir.
Q. MR. CALLIS·TER: That is all.
MR. AADNE,SEN: No questions. (R. 84)
The writing captioned "Bonus Plan for 1949" intro~
A.
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duced and admitted as Mr. Scoville's Exhibit B at R.
20, was signed by Mr. Leslie Carl Borsum.
The letter da:ted Ap.ril 25, 1950, from Mr. Borsum
to Mr. Scoville, transmitting the check in the sum of
$1,026.88, (Company's Exhibit 8 admitted at R. 5) representing the balance due Mr. Scoville on the 1949 bonus as
computed by the Company under the 1949 writing was
signed by Mr. Borsum. (See R. 51, as to stipulation of
signature).
The letter dated July 24, 1949 to Mr. L. C. Borsum
from Mr. 'Scoville, (admitted as the Company's Exhibit
10 at R. 61), was addressed to Mr. L. C. Borsum, Kellogg
Sales Company, Battle Creek, Michigan.
A letter dated August 2, 1949 to Mr. Scoville (admitted as the Company's· Exhibit 11 at R. 65) which was
from Mr. L. C. Borsum (R. 64) contained the following
p-aragraph which appeare:d as the last paragraph therein:
"We are_ having a sales meeting in Omaha on
August 8 and 9, and I think that you should be
there at that time. Will be looking forward to
seeing you."
·
The Company, through counsel, objected to the testi~
mony of the conversations had with Mr. Borsum on the,
ground that the testimony with respect to such conversations would be an attempt to bind the Kellogg Sales Company by a statement of the Kellogg Company (R. 23).
The Company objected to such conversations on the
ground that it is an attempt to bind the employee of one
organization against another· (R. 25). These objections
were renewed and app-ear elsewhere in the record. The
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Honorable Trial Judge granted the Company's Inotion
to strike such testin1ony on the grounds as stated. .
The testimony of :J[r. Scoville establishe'd that Mr.
Le~lie Carl Borsum is the Sales ~Ianager for the United
States for .the I~ellogg Sales Con1pany. The conversations by their very nature, by inference, tend to establish
the position and the authority of Mr. Borsum to bind the
Kellogg Sales Co1npany. The writing captioned "Bonus
Plan for 1949" was signed "L. C. Borsum." This is the
very writing by '\vhich the Company attempted to bind
~Ir. Scoville and the Kellogg Sales Company. This writing '\vas received subsequent to any conversations had by
Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum. If the view is taken that
Mr. Borsum did not have authority to bind the Kellogg
Sales Company, then he certainly had no authority by
which to establish the 1949 writing as an agreement between the Company and Mr. Scoville.
The letter dated April 25, 1950, enclosing the check
in the sum of $1,026.88, which represented the balance
due, computed at the rate contended for by the Kellogg
Sales Company, was signed by Mr. Borsum. At the time
of trial, in answer to the question "so that you figured
all that Mr. ScoiVille had coming to him was ·what you
paid him_under this~", Mr. Borsum answered "Yes sir.''
The only inferences that can be drawn from this question
and answer is that Mr. Borsum was an employee of the
Kellogg Sales Company; that he figured the amount of
the bonus at the rate contended for by the Kellogg Sale.s
Company and p,aid Mr. Scoville; that Mr~ Borsum was
an employee of the Kellogg 'Sales Company.
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All of the evidence that was adduced at the trial
was consistent with the testimony of Mr. Scoville that
Mr. Borsum was the Sales Manager of the entire United
States for the Kellogg Sales Company. There were no
inconsistencies. The only statement made that Mr. Borsum was an employe:e of someone other than the Kellogg
Sales Company was the statement of Mr. Borsum that at
the time of the trial he was employed by the Kellogg
Company, which is not inconsistent with prior employment with the Kellogg Sales Comp·any.
By inference Mr. Borsum had authority to set bonus
plans as per the writing captioned· "Bonus Plan for
1949," ('Scoville's Exhibit B, admitted at R. 20). By inference Mr. Borsum had authority to require the at~end
ance of Mr. Sco:ville at sales meetings as p·er the letter of
August 2, 1949, (Comp·any's Exhrbit 11) and by inference
Mr. Borsum had authority to make payments of wages
to ·Mr. Scoville as per the letter dated April 25, 1950.
The trial court erred in striking the testimony with
regard to conversations had betwe.en Mr. Scoville and
· Mr. L. C. Borswn.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT FOR THE COMPANY AFTER WRONGLY EXCLUDED
TESTIMONY WHICH TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE CASE
FOR MR. SCOVILLE.

Mr. Scoville's testimony as to conversations with
Mr. Williams and Mr. Borsum· was substantial evidence
establishing his ease· for recovery of the balance due as
his bonus for the year 1949. The trial court was in error
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as sho,vn under Points I, II and III in exeluding the conyer~a.tions \Yith :\lr. Borsum. The court erred as shown
under Points I and II in excluding the testimony of Mr.
Sroville as to his conversation \Yith l\fr. Williams. These
c.onversa tions created a bonus plan for 1949. The~ established the rate of such bonus to be $2.00 per ton of feed
sold. If such conversations had been considered and applied in the n1ost favorable light to the plaintiff's cause
of action, the court could not have directed a verdict for
the Company. The trial court erred in directing a verdict.
The rule is followed in this state that where defendant moves for a directed verdict, the evidence must be
considered and applied in the most favorable light to the
plaintiff's cause of action. Groesbeck vs. Lake Side
Printing Company, Sup. Ct. of Utah, 1919, 55 Utah 335,
186 Pac. 103. In applying this rule the court must (1)
take all facts proved by the evidence; (2) take all facts
tended to be proved by the evidence ; and ( 3) draw all
inferences from the evidence for the plaintiff.
It is also a well established rule in this state that
where there is any substantial evidence upon which the
jury could find for the plaintiff under the pleadings,
the trial court must submit the issues to the jury and cannot direct a verdict. A. W. Sewell Comparny vs. Commercial Casualty Company, Sup. Ct. of Utah 1932, 15
Pac. 2d 327.
As shown in Points I, II and III the testimony as to
conversations in question should have been admitted in
evidence.
.
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The only inferences which may be drawn from .the
conversation which took place on N oventber 4,- 1948 between Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum as set out under
Point I, supra, is that there would be a bonus for the
year 1949; that such bonus would be at the rate of $2.00
per ton o~ feed sold of the same type as that described
in Bulletin 148-3 as set out under Point I, supra.
Mr. Scoville testified with respect to the conversation which took place on April16, 1949, as foilows:
R. 25, 26:
A. I asked both Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams
if they thought I had about enough turkey
contracts in this teTritory.
And Mr. Williams stated I should go ahead
and sell all the contracts I could. He could
make the feed. He was in charge ·of the
Omaha Plant.
I said: "You are also going to pay me a lot
of bonus too."
He said: "We have got money to pay the
bonus, you sell the feed."
Then we left the room and started downstairs.
Q. Who left the room~
A. Mr. Borsum, Mr. Williams and myself left
the room to go downstairs.
I said : "Bill, it will take a lot of feed, and I
will get a lot of bonus, it is pretty near time
to shut off out there.''
He said : "We will take care of you, Kellogg
has got plenty of money and we will make the
feed." (R. 26).
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Mrs. Scoville testified \vith re~pect to the conver~
sation which took place on April 16, 1949 as follo\vs:
R. 79:
1lr. Scoville, said that the ainotmt of contracts he had \Yritten would be bet\veen four hundred thousand and four hundred fifty thousand
turkeys~ and he suggested they not take-any more
contracts and ~Ir. vVillia1ns ·said they were "feed
htmgry,"' and they would continue to take contracts as long as they were justified. Mr. Scoville re1ninded hin1 again that $2.00 bonus was still
in effect, and there was never anything contrary
said to that. (R. 79).
The only inference which can be drawn from this ·conversation is that the 1949 bonus would be comp·ute.d at the
rate of $2.00 per ton of feed sold. An acceptance of this
arrangement can be found in the continuation of sales
by Mr. Scoville during the year 1949.
It must also be noted that Mr. Scoville's cause is aided by a presumption that in continuing in t~e service of
the Company, the terms of his employment would be the.
same for the year 1949 as they·were for the year 1948.
· ·Holton vs. Hart Mill Co., cited supra, Sup. Ct. of Wash.,
1946, 166 Pac. 2d 186.
During the last part of July or early part of August,
Mr. Scoville received a writing which is captioned "Bonus
Plan for 1949" (and which was admitted as Mr. Scoville's Exhibit B) (R. 20) setting out certain figures to be
paid as a bonus on sales for the year 1949. This was
the first written notice received by Mr. Sco~le which indicated that the figures to be used by the Company in
computing. the 1949 bonus would be different than that
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used to computed the 1948 bonus (R. 19). Mr. Scoville·
protested several times orally to Mr. Williams and Mr.
Borsum about the writing which he received as setting
out figures to be used by the Company in computing the
1949 bonus (R. 72, R. 28). Mr. Sco;ville's fear of losing
his job explains the manner in which he conducted his
protest about the 1949 writing. He felt that he was too
old a man to lose the job and have to go out a!ld hunt
for a new one (R. 71).
The facts as recited above would support a verdict
that an oral agreement providing for a $2.00 a ton bonus
for the year 1949 was entered into. The evidence introduced at the trial would support a verdict by the jury that
there was no assent to the 1949 writing captioned "Bonus
Plan for 1949.". Such evidence being substantial and
such that it would have supported a verdict.
The trial court erred in directing a verdict for the
Company.
CONCLUSION
The Comp:any's Bulletin numbered 148-3, dated
January 29, 1948, established a bonus plan for the year
1948. Parol evidence was offered which tended to establish a subsequent oral agreement to the 1948 bonus plan
under which Mr. Scoville would be entitled to a $2.00
per ton bonus for feed sold for the Company during the
year 1949, this parol evidence was stricken on the
grounds that it was a variation. or alteration of the 1948
Bulletin 148-3. The trial court erred in striking such
evidence in that it is permissible to modify a prior writ40
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ten agreen1ent by parol or to enter into a subsequent oral
agree1nent regarding the same subject n1atter but as to a
different period of time.
The trial court also erred in striking parol evidence
to prove a prior oral agreen1ent w'"hich was different from
the terms of a purported "'"ritten agreement, which writing was contested as not being· the written agreement
of the parties. There was substantial evidence to establish that there W'"as no assent to the purported written
agreement, i.e., the 1949 writing captioned "Bonus Plan
for 1949." It is not in violation of the Parol Evidence
Rule to allow parol evidence of a prior oral agreement
where the instrument contended to be the written agreement is contested and there is evidence that there was
no assent to such writing; the Parol Evidence Rule, presuming the existence of a written agreement. In this
case the writing is contested as being a written agreement.
The trial court erred in striking the testimony of Mr.
L. C. Borsum on the grounds that Mr. Borsum was not
an employee of the Kellogg Sales Company but of the
Kellogg Company. The only evidence being to the effect
that dll!ing the times in question, Mr. L. C. Borsum was
an employee of the Kellogg Sales Company. The only
evidence of any other employment was that Mr. Borsum
was an emplo~ee of the Kellogg Company at the time of
trial.
The evidence, having been stricken, was not considered by the Trial Judge in directing a verdict. Had the
Trial Judge considered such evidence, he would not have
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been able to direct a verdict under the rules followed
in Utah in directing a verdict.
It can be seen that Mr. Scoville was denied the consideration of that evidence which should have been considered by the Trial Judge in directing a verdict. It is
also quite evident that Mr. Scoville was deprived of his
right to have all of his evidence considered by the jury.
Mr. Scoville's theory of the case was not at anytime considered by/ the Trial Judge nor was it allowed to go to
the jury. There is substantial evidence in the record to
support the theory of Mr. Scoville's case. Having been
de·prived of the consideration of his theory and the consideration of the evidence in support of his theory he
has been precluded from obtaining the consideration of
his recovery of a bonus on sales, which when computed
upon the basis of the tonnages stipulated to by counsel
(R. 12) as shown by the amended complaint (R. 1) would
amount to the sum of $16,183.53.
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of
conversations with Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams should
not have been stricken. That the trial court erred in directing a verdict; that the trial court should be reversed
and the case remanded with instructions for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER, JR.
REESE C. ANDER·SON
Attorneys. for .A.p·pellant
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